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 Unity of Knowledge and Action: Toward a Nonrepresentational Theory of
 Knowledge. By Warren Frisina. State University of New York Press, 2002.
 262 pages. $22.95.
 The title of this book is inspired by the Neo-Confucian scholar, Wang
 Yangming (1472-1529). However, the volume is not devoted solely to Wang
 Yangming's philosophy about the unity of knowledge and action. Wang is only
 one of several thinkers brought into this philosophical conversation and does
 not even receive the most attention (Richard Rorty has that honor). The conver-
 sation is interesting and occasionally illuminating, although one is not sure at
 the end whether it is moving toward one particular nonrepresentation theory
 of knowledge or whether the conversation partners who share an aversion to
 representational theories might disagree profoundly about what kind of nonrep-
 resentational theory will suffice.
 Frisina's aim in this work is to highlight the connections among Neo-Confucian,
 pragmatic, and process philosophies' nonrepresentational metaphysics and epis-
 temology, against the background of contemporary challenges to the representa-
 tional theory of knowledge within analytic philosophy, postanalytic philosophy,
 continental philosophy, and cognitive science. These contemporary challenges
 found in the works of Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty, Charles Taylor, and
 Daniel Dennett are inadequate in their metaphysical assumptions. In this respect,
 Frisina believes that the metaphysics of Wang Yangming, John Dewey, and Alfred
 North Whitehead will clear the path toward a nonrepresentational theory of
 knowledge, wherein "knowledge and action are really one thing" (2).
 The case for the unity of knowledge and action is made "largely by exposi-
 tion, juxtaposition, and reconstruction" (8) rather than analytic arguments. The
 exposition of the works of thinkers included is clear and engaging. The author's
 discussion of works of Davidson, Rorty, Taylor, and Dennett not only lays out
 the central problems of representational theories within epistemology itself but
 also elucidates the significant implications of such epistemology for our under-
 standing of the self, of the human mind, of the way we experience one another
 and the world.
 One implication of treating knowledge as representation of an external world
 separate from the self, rather than as a form of action through which the self
 engages the rest of the world, is the reduction of qualities and values to mere
 epiphenomena without objective reality. Taylor resists this conclusion by showing
 the phenomenological necessity of the evaluative process in constituting the self.
 Frisina criticizes Taylor for not giving values ontological status. Frisina favors what
 he calls Dewey's and Whitehead's nonreductionistic naturalism, which posits a
 continuity between human experience and that of other organisms, as capable of
 supplying the requisite ontological ballast.
 Frisina defends the viability and relevance of metaphysics from a pragmatic
 point of view: it need not involve deductive and a priori foundations but could be
 a hypothetical and speculative account of the general traits of experience that
 enables us to better appreciate how knowledge is a form of action. The book
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 probably would not convince those pragmatists who are most resistant to meta-
 physical speculations; they would insist that we are more in need of a concrete
 nonrepresentational theory of knowledge that works, and metaphysical discus-
 sions would only divert energy into inconsequential disagreements.
 The central chapters of the book present the metaphysical and epistemologi-
 cal positions of Wang, Dewey, and Whitehead. Wang proposed the doctrine of
 "unity of knowledge and action" in response to the epistemological dualism
 among Ming dynasty Neo-Confucians who separated learning from acting.
 Wang's doctrine builds on five metaphysical presuppositions. Being is dynamic
 within the universe viewed as a creative matrix of processes, which "underscores
 the ontological continuity between human existence and nature" (80). There is
 ontological interdependence in the "interactions of vibratory wave patterns of
 yin contraction and yang extension" (80-81) constituting the processes of the
 universe. Li (principle) creates all the patterns of interactions, while individual li,
 each specific pattern created, defines a specific entity. By extending ii in ways
 previously not realized, one could "form one body with all things" (84). The
 potential of ontological interdependence has to be made manifest through
 human creative participation in the harmonic structures of Li. In maximizing
 the possibilities within the creative process, one fulfils ch'eng (sincerity), which
 integrates human creativity with the cosmic creativity of Li.
 Wang's metaphysics precludes separation of physical from mental, of sub-
 ject from object, of knowledge from action. Within that metaphysics, knowledge
 is a movement within the larger movements of the Tao itself. Subject and object
 are unified in the identification of hsin (heart-mind) with Li from the beginning.
 Knowledge and action are one thing because Li is not to be sought outside the
 hsin, which is not merely a cognitive center but where "we create who we are by
 determining what our relation with others will be" (92). Knowledge is the
 action of relating creatively and harmoniously with others (including objects).
 The move toward a nonrepresentational theory of knowledge is aided by de-
 emphasizing cognitive processes in favor of continuity of all experiences implying
 pre-cognitive sources of knowledge. Wang's concept of liang-chih (innate know-
 ledge) is one such source: a prereflective moment that "preceded and provided
 the foundation for all more complicated cognitive activity" (94).
 Dewey and Whitehead also expand experience beyond cognition in their
 attempt to combat the pernicious dichotomies that afflict substance ontology
 and its epistemological consequences. While mindful of their differences, Frisina
 sees similarities in Wang, Dewey, and Whitehead with regard to an ontology
 wherein "final real things" (141) are not fixed substances with secondary charac-
 teristics but "nodes of causal relatedness" (141). For them, cognition is not "an
 ontologically distinct purely mental re-presentation of what is happening in the
 causal realm" (141). It is a specific kind of relational activity, continuous rather
 than separate from perception because instead of ontological divides separating
 minds and bodies, experience and nature, there is only one organic continuum.
 Frisina acknowledges that the panpsychism and organicism in such meta-
 physics are viewed with suspicion and devotes one chapter to outlining and
 responding to Rorty's critique of panpsychism in Dewey's concept of experience,
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 which describes an organism's coping with its environment. "Experience is not
 an essential characteristic of an independently existing subject. It is, rather, a
 trait exhibited within organic situations and in that sense is not owned by any
 individual" (156). In Frisina's view panpsychism offers a nonreductive physical-
 ism. It dissolves the problem of connecting mental to physical and relating cog-
 nition to perception without reducing one to the other. Apart from avoiding
 problematic dualisms, panpsychism is also becoming fashionable in certain
 philosophical circles "newly fascinated by the way bodies, minds, experience,
 and nature are all interwoven into a complex organic network" (161).
 Frisina considers Rorty's worry, that any use of "experience" raises the
 specter of representationalism, a consequence of his early commitment to the
 linguistic turn which creates an unbridgeable gulf between perception and
 cognition. Deweyans such as Frisina have no problem with Rorty's accounts
 of language as a coping tool rather than a mapping device, and of the contin-
 gent creation of selves and worlds through language games, but they balk at
 Rorty's claim that there can be no criterion governing the shift from one lan-
 guage game to another. There is no absolute atemporal criterion, but Dewey
 would insist that such shifts occur because the new game offers greater satis-
 faction. While the definition of "satisfaction" is left open, this is not a rejec-
 tion of all criteria. Rorty's linguistic turn leads him to suppose, contrary to
 Dewey, that higher order cognitive activity is independent of other levels of
 experience.
 Frisina gives Rorty credit for "exposing the radical side of the early Prag-
 matic thinkers" (178) in a manner similar to the way Taoist insights facilitate the
 expression of tendencies toward openness and spontaneity in Neo-Confucian
 thought. Neo-Confucians remain Confucian even as they learned from the
 Taoist by reaffirming their commitment to human responsibility for creating
 new orders as partners with heaven and earth. Similarly, Deweyans remain prag-
 matic even as they assimilate Rorty's postmodernism by reaffirming the conti-
 nuity between linguistic behavior and all other levels of experience, between
 experience and nature.
 In conclusion, Frisina brings to readers' attention the works of two con-
 temporary philosophers who assert the organic bases of human cognition.
 Mark Johnson's work from within the field of analytic philosophy, cognitive
 science, and linguistics provides resources for building on the metaphysical
 insights of Neo-Confucianism, pragmatism, and process philosophy, to build
 a nonrepresentational theory of knowledge. Robert Neville has attempted a
 comprehensive "axiology of thinking" (215) that takes account of the role of
 values in cognition.
 In providing a starting point for connecting the projects of a disparate
 group, Frisina succeeds in making it "easier for followers of each thinker to see
 how their work connects fruitfully with followers of the others" (235-236).
 doi: 10.1093/jaarel/lfi127  Sor-hoon Tan
 National University of Singapore
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Wed, 01 Aug 2018 07:45:47 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
